一、Consent to Assisted Reproduction – Cal. Fam. Code § 7613(a)
一、 同意辅助生殖说——《加利福尼亚州家庭法典》§ 7613(a)
California Family Code § 7613(a) provides: “If a woman conceived through assisted reproduction with sperm … donated by a donor who is not the woman’s spouse, with the consent of another intended parent, that intended parent is treated in law as if that intended parent is the natural parent of a child thereby conceived.” The statute further provides that the required consent can be established either by proof of written consent, or by proof by clear and convincing evidence that “prior to the conception of the child, the woman and the intended parent had an oral agreement that the woman and the intended parent would both be parents of the child.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a)(2).
加州家庭法典§ 7613(a)规定：如果一个女性在另一个预期的双亲同意下通过精子辅助生殖受孕……精子捐献者并非该女子配偶，那么另一个预期的双亲就有和孩子的自然父母一样的法律地位。该法还规定，可以通过书面同意证明或通过明确而有说服力的证据证明“在受孕之前，那位女性和另一个预期的双亲已经口头约定二者都是孩子的双亲。” 《加利福尼亚州家庭法典》 § 7613(a)(2).
Under § 7613(a), a person who consents consistent with the statute is a parent; this is true regardless of whether the person has a genetic connection to the resulting child. Thus, the statute provides that the intended parent is a parent of the resulting child even if both the sperm and the ova are donated by donors. This provision applies equally to all intended parents, regardless of their sex or marital status. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (providing that “that intended parent is treated in law” as a legal parent). Parentage is based on the person’s deliberate conduct in bringing a child into the world through assisted reproduction with the intention of parenting the child with the person who gives birth.
在 § 7613(a)下，无论这个人是否同所生孩子有遗传亲缘联系，符合规定表示同意的人就是双亲之一 。因此，该法规规定，即使精子和卵子都是由捐赠者捐赠的，预期的双亲也是所生孩子的双亲。这项规定平等地适用于所有预期的双亲，无论其性别或婚姻状况如何。例如参见 《加利福尼亚州家庭法典》 § 7613(a) (规定“在法律上将预期的双亲视为合法双亲”。). 亲子关系是基于这个人以同分娩母亲一同养育为目的，通过辅助生殖技术有意将孩子生下而建立的。
二、Living with the Child and Holding the Child Out as One’s Child – Cal. Fam. Code § 7611(d)
Woman A’s parentage of Child B could also be established under the “holding out” presumption of parentage. Under California law, a person is presumed to be a legal parent if, during the child’s minority, the person “received the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d).
This provision applies equally to all persons, regardless of marital status or sex. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (holding that an unmarried same-sex partner was a parent of twin children conceived through assisted reproduction and birthed by her former same-sex partner).
这项规定平等地适用于所有人，不论其婚姻状况或性别。例如在Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005)案中，法院认为一个未婚的女同性恋者是利用辅助生殖技术并由其前任生下的双胞胎的双亲之一。
As a matter of California law, it is clear that a person can be a legal parent under this provision even if they are not, and know they are not, the child’s genetic parent. See, e.g., In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 2002) (holding that an unmarried man was a legal parent under the holding out presumption even though he was not, and knew he was not, the child’s genetic parent).
在加州法律体系下，该条款可以明确，即使某人不是该孩子的遗传学父母，也知道自己不是该孩子的遗传学父母，这个人也可以是合法双亲之一。例如，在In re Nicholas H. 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 2002)案中，法院认为一个未婚男性即使明知自己不是孩子的遗传学父母，也可以通过抚养被推定为合法父母。
Indeed, fifteen years ago, the California Supreme Court held that an unmarried lesbian partner was a legal parent under this provision of twin children birthed by her former partner and conceived through assisted reproduction. The woman was presumed to be a parent of the twins “because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children.” Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005). While this presumption of parentage can be rebutted under some circumstances, the California Supreme Court went on to hold that it was “not an appropriate action in which to rebut the presumption that Elisa is the twins’ parent with proof that she is not the children’s biological mother because she actively participated in causing the children to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise the children as her own together with the birth mother, she voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood after the children were born, and there are no competing claims to her being the children’s second parent.” Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670.
其实在十五年前，加州最高法院就依据此规定裁定一个未婚的女同性恋者是一对由她的前任伴侣通过辅助生殖技术受孕并产下的双胞胎的合法双亲之一。这名女性被推测是双胞胎的双亲之一，“因为她把孩子们带进了家里，并公开地把他们当成她的亲生孩子”。Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005). 尽管这种亲子关系的推定在某些情况下可以被推翻，加州最高法院仍然认为“以其不是双胞胎的生物学母亲的证据推翻这种亲子关系的推论非常不恰当，因为她抱着自己和生母一同把孩子视如己出的目的，积极地参与到孩子受孕的过程中，她在孩子降生后主动接受了作为双亲的权利和义务，无疑是孩子除生母外的另一个双亲。” Elisa B.案 117 P.3d at 670.
Where the parties jointly decided to bring the child into the world through assisted reproduction with the intention that they would both parent the resulting child, even short periods of living together with the child and holding the child out as one’s own can be sufficient to establish legal parentage under the “holding out presumption.” For example, in Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 175 Cal. App. 4th 361, 367 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009), the California Court of Appeal court held that a woman was the legal parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction and born to her former partner based on evidence that the woman lived with the child and jointly parented the child for approximately 13 weeks before the birth mother moved out with the child.
如果双方以共同抚养孩子为目的，共同决定通过辅助生殖技术使孩子降生，即使同孩子只有短暂的共同居住并将孩子视如己出，也足够通过“抚养推定”建立法定亲子关系。例如，在Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 175 Cal. App. 4th 361, 367 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009)案中，加州上诉法院将一位女性裁定为一个借助辅助生殖技术并由她前任生下的孩子的法定母亲，因为有证据证明这位女性在孩子的生母和孩子一同搬走前和孩子住在一起并和生母一起抚养了孩子达十三周。
Accordingly, regardless of Woman A’s marital status, Woman A would be a parent under California’s holding out presumption. Woman A would be entitled to the presumption because she received the child into the home in which she was living and held the child out as her own. It would not be an appropriate action in which to find the presumption rebutted under California law because in the hypothetical, Woman A participated in the joint decision to bring Child B into the world through assisted reproduction with the intention of jointly parenting Child B, she accepted the rights and responsibilities of parenthood for Child B, and, because the parties used a sperm donor, there is no other person who could claim parentage of Child B.